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Response
George T. McCandless, Jr.
I. Alice, an Introduction
We have been taken on an extensive tour of neoradical political
theory. We have had the good fortune of having Professor Herb
Addo as our guide, so the tour has been lively and illuminating.
However, in the end, one gets a sense that this neoradical political theory is a lot like Alice’s Wonderland. It begins with a long
and sorrowful tale, nearly drowns us in a sea of tears that
accompanies the sad whining of an outmoded dependency theory, and ends with a trial in which it is axiomatic that something
called “Global Capitalism” is guilty of the “ever-increasing efficient accumulation of global capital” and that “the only thing
that remains the same is the changing continuity of the exploitation of the Third World by ever-refining imperialist ways and
means.” As in Alice’s trial, the West is already judged guilty and
no evidence need be presented. What case there is is made by
the rhetorical devices of assertion and repetition.
But Alice eventually awakes from her dream Wonderland
and, so, I feel obliged to try to drag our neoradicals from their
intellectual demimonde. In doing this, I will take on some of the
neoradicals’ assertions directly. First, I would like to straighten
out some of the supposed facts about economic growth and
international capital flows. Second, I would like to indicate why
I think much of radical or neoradical theory is not very useful.
Finally, I would like to briefly describe what are probably more
mundane but certainly more useful recommendations on economic policies that a Third World country can follow to increase
its rate of economic growth.
II. What We Know about Development
A basic tenet of the radical and neoradical faith is that the “center” has been getting richer at the expense of an increasingly
impoverished “periphery.” In a recent paper, Parente and
Prescott show that if one compares the real per capita income of
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the five richest and the five poorest countries in the world (as
fractions of the U.S. per capita income), the ratio has remained
virtually unchanged over the last thirty years. The average per
capita income of the five poorest countries has remained at
about one thirty-second of that of the five richest. If one looks at
the country by country distribution of per capita income (again
as fractions of U.S. per capita income), there has been an important change over the last thirty years: the global distribution of
per capita income has become flatter. This change in distribution
implies an increasing variance in income of about 16 percent
during the thirty-year period. However, the increasing variance
did not come by poor countries uniformly becoming poorer;
some of the poorest countries in 1960 were among those that
experienced the fastest growth. The increased variance occurred
because some middle-income countries became richer, some
poorer. Most of the ten countries that showed the greatest
decline in per capita income were involved in either civil or
international conflicts during the period. For someone outside
the neoradical faith, the issue is complex and is not simply one
of the “North” growing “inordinately rich” and the “South”
growing “filthy poor.”
While the radicals and neoradicals claim that the distribution
of income inside Third World countries has worsened, there is
little data to bring to this claim, most of that anecdotal. Most
Third World countries have growing middle and upper classes
that have at least reduced their ostentatious display of wealth.
For example, in modern Argentina, there is no current display of
wealth similar to that of the palaces built by the turn-of-the-century cattle barons. In Third World countries, the really wealthy
of today are those politicians who ruled their countries during
natural resource booms. Among the economics profession, the
most famous of these is former Mexican president Portillo, who,
upon retiring from the presidency, is reported to have gone to
Switzerland to join the two-billion-dollar pension fund he managed to stow away there during his presidency. Similar anecdotes, but with smaller numbers, exist involving Indonesia,
Nigeria, and Venezuela.
Many Third World countries currently subsidize the domestic
price of basic food commodities such as rice, beans, and corn
and, by doing so, raise the living standard of the urban poor. (I
162
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would be derelict not to point out that this potentially useful
practice is frowned upon by World Bank officials.) Unfortunately, in many countries this subsidy is paid by the rural poor,
who are forced to accept lower prices for the goods they produce. So the urban poor are made better off by a policy that
makes the usually poorer rural poor even worse off. In the great
majority of Third World countries, many people who are officially unemployed are really working in the informal sector.
How many of them there are and what they are earning are
unknowns. In any case, the data are contradictory. It is not a fact
that income distributions in Third World countries are worse
today than, say, fifty years ago. We simply do not know.
Except for a few unusual years, Latin American countries
have been net receivers of world investment since their independence. Neoradicals frequently point to Argentina, Brazil, and
Bolivia during their years of hyperinflation and to Chile during
the years of gross economic mismanagement under Salvador
Allende as periods when nationals with wealth sought international safe havens and generated net capital outflows. In almost
every other period, Latin American countries have received an
enormous amount of capital from international capital markets.
Very shortly after gaining independence from Spain, Latin
American countries were able to borrow on the London market,
and private European banks opened branches in major Latin
American cities. In another example, the phenomenal growth of
Latin American railroad networks in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries and the economic booms that followed
were almost entirely financed by British and U.S. capital. Consider Africa. Since independence, the countries of Africa have
received massive inflows of capital, some as direct private
investment, some as government to government gifts, some
from international agencies, and some as loans. In fact, the World
Development Report 1991 shows that in each decade since 1950,
every region of the Third World has received net resource
inflows. In 1992, the resource inflow to the forty poorest countries of the world averaged five percent of their total consumption.1 Neoradicals may argue that they would prefer the
resource flows into the Third World to be larger than what they
have been and, in fact, so would I. However, based on the data,
the claim that the goal of the “Global Capitalism” is “the ever163
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increasingly efficient leakage of capital from the periphery of the
system to the center of it” is very strange because, if that is the
goal, “Global Capitalism” is failing dismally at achieving it.
III. A Critique of Neoradical Thought
Why is it that most of what comes under the heading of radical
or neoradical thought about development is not very useful? For
some intellectual effort to be useful, it is not sufficient for it
merely to name the actors in the global farce and to assign various amounts of blame to each one of them. To be useful, it must
provide alternatives. In addition, it is particularly helpful if
these alternatives are (1) technically feasible; (2) sufficiently well
articulated to permit careful analysis, testing, and implementation; and (3) do not require a social revolution for implementation. The first two are characteristics one would ask of any good
theory. The third is included because revolutions are known to
be particularly difficult to control and far too frequently have
unfortunate outcomes. May I offer the French Revolution, the
Cultural Revolution in China, and Pol Pot in Cambodia as examples?
Real intellectual advances among radicals have been hamstrung by their slavish adherence to the canons of Marxian theology. Professor Addo’s paper is proof enough of that and, in
addition, it is proof that Professor Addo is a brave man. In what
is a significant departure from standard radical fare, a large fraction of his paper is devoted to a serious attempt to get the faithful to abandon one of the major pillars of Marxism: that History
(with capital H) inexorably advances to a particular goal and
that this goal is the fall of capitalism and its replacement by a
proletarian utopia. The Marxist Inquisition has historically been
unkind to heretics.
Professor Addo’s creative pessimism fails to be useful for the
second of my three reasons. While he peddles creative pessimism as a magic elixir, as an intellectual paradigm it is insufficiently well articulated to be either implemented or analyzed. It
is also not necessary. Professor Addo’s unease about events in
Russia shows that he has considerable sympathy for Edmund
Burke, who followed similar lines of argument with respect to
the French Revolution. My own unease about Russia has a quite
164
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different basis. I have watched the rulers of the countries of the
new Eastern Europe squabbling over the ruins of the Soviet
empire and dismantling the old Soviet allocation mechanisms
while failing to put into place the legal and taxation systems
required to get new mechanisms working. Private enterprise
systems do not operate well without well-defined legal rights to
private property and adjudication mechanisms for settling disputes. In addition, the method of setting prices under the old
centrally planned economy generated substantial implicit subsidies and tax revenues. Russia’s enormous inflation and the rise
of extralegal enforcement agents (more commonly known as the
Russian mafia) are the inevitable results of this delay in implementation.
Viewed from the perspective of usefulness, the radical and
neoradical theory of dependency and its religious equivalent,
liberation theology, fail utterly. This theory is almost totally outward looking. Based on the dual delusions of paranoia and
aggrandizement, dependency theory views both the poverty
and the failure to grow of Third World countries as a result of
their dependence on the firms and governments of First World
countries for most of the technology and goods they consume
and for the markets for the natural resources and (generally primary) products they produce. Dependency theorists argue that
the “North” should pay more for goods they import from the
Third World and charge less for goods they export to the Third
World. How this will be done in a decentralized global economy
where pricing mechanisms are outside the control of any government is never explained. That these arguments have had any
effect on resource allocations at all is more a testament to the
humanity and sympathy of the citizens of First World countries
than to the intellectual merit of the theories. Of course the Third
World countries are dependent on the global economy — every
country that trades is, rich or poor. Of course they cannot control it—except for a temporary event like the OPEC price rises of
the 1970s, no one can. The poorest countries are not so much
subservient to the world economy as they are irrelevant to it. In
1992, a mere 2 percent of world trade involved the 40 poorest
countries and only 22 percent involved the poorest 108. Seventyeight percent of the world’s trade was between the richest
twenty-four countries. One can easily understand the popularity
165
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among the intellectuals of Third World countries of a collective
delusion that claims that their countries are very much “functional parts” of world capitalism, “in the process of the system’s
self-creation by self-propulsion.” However, if this were true,
their countries would be taken more seriously in world affairs.
Social or development theories that use religion as a predictive variable (as Professor Addo uses when he proposes that the
prevalence of Confucianism among the Asian NICs is what
causes their development) miss the point entirely. Religion is
endogenous to a society; each society has the religion that fits
that society’s nature and requirements. History has shown us
that when a religion fails to fit that nature, it is discarded for
another one. Admittedly, the institutional hierarchy of a religion
will resist the change, but over time the resistance is usually
futile. Aggressive, expansionist societies require aggressive,
expansionist religions. Passive, introspective societies require
passive, introspective religions. The correlation that Professor
Addo (following on similar theories of other eminent scholars
such as Max Weber) has pointed out between Confucianism and
the newly industrialized countries of Asia only reflects the fact
that Confucian ideas appeal to the societies that prize order,
obedience, and learning — three characteristics that apparently
aid in growth. The Asian countries where these ideas are not
valued so highly do not have such high growth rates and, concomitantly, do not have a strong Confucian ethic. Claiming that
Confucianism gives rise to growth is imputing a causal direction
that is not warranted. In fact, thirty years ago, social theorists
used Confucianism to “explain” why Asian countries were not
growing.
IV. What Just Might Work
Having spent this much time talking about what is wrong with
the radical approach to development theory, I would like to
point out some directions of research that I think are potentially
very useful.
For twenty years, from 1965 to 1985, economic theory had not
been able to say much about what a Third World country can do
to help itself. Western economics’ principal technical tool was
Robert Solow’s neoclassical growth model (1956). This model
166
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concentrated on the role of the labor force, technological
progress, savings, and capital accumulation as the main engines
of growth. This theory fell into disfavor because one of its main
predictions was that massive amounts of capital should flow
from rich (high capital-to-labor ratio) countries to poor (low capital-to-labor ratio) countries. Over time, all countries should end
up with the same capital-to-labor ratios and the same growth
rates. This result is flatly contradicted by the data. An embarrassed silence fell on development theory. It was unable to
explain the failure of poor countries to attract capital.
That silence was broken in 1986 by Paul Romer. Romer added
skills (which economists call human capital) to Solow’s model
and hypothesized that the more skills there are in an economy,
the easier it is for others in that economy to acquire skills.
Romer’s version of the neoclassical growth model provided predictions dramatically different from the earlier version. Poor
countries with low skill levels would not attract foreign capital
because the return on the capital would be low; machines are
not very productive when those using them are relatively
unskilled. Countries with few skills could become trapped in a
poverty equilibrium where the low skill level made it very difficult if not impossible for young members of the economy to get
international-level skills. The continuing low levels of human
capital discourage foreign investment in physical capital. In
other words, when the slaves on Saint Domingue revolted and
slaughtered almost everyone in their country who had an education, they may have been condemning their descendants to
perpetual poverty. Romer’s model also predicts that poor countries that make large investments in human capital may be able
to break out of the poverty equilibrium and achieve high rates of
growth. The Asian NICs are unusual in both their high levels of
economic growth and their high rates of investment in skills.
Bob Lucas has produced a model that is an interesting variant
on Romer’s. In Lucas’s model, skills are acquired on the job so
that countries that are producing goods learn to produce those
goods better. In the early stages of their modern growth experience, both Korea and Japan encouraged production for export
(and discouraged imports) by intentionally undervaluing their
currency. This policy encouraged expansion of higher skill
industries and a learning-by-doing driven by comparative
167
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advantage in manufactured goods. Note that this policy is very
different in both its incentive structure and its outcomes from
the Import Substituting Industrialization policies of most Latin
American countries in the 1960s.
While net resource flows to the poorest forty countries have
been positive, net private capital flows to these countries have
been slightly negative. These countries have so little physical
capital that the return on investments there should be very high
(even when their relatively low skill levels are taken into
account). Most Third World countries do not have the legal
structure, enforcement mechanisms, and financial institutions
that would allow investment and the monitoring of that investment to be done relatively inexpensively. Most private firms in
Third World countries are financed on familial, extended familial, or interlocking (reciprocal) ownership lines. The extrafamilial networks of trust and the legal institutions that protect and
encourage trust that are the hallmark of developed countries’
capital markets simply do not exist in Third World countries.
The failure of Third World governments to develop appropriate
financial and legal institutions condemns their countries to a
scarcity of capital and a form of petty capitalism that makes
them unable to compete in international markets.
In many countries, the legal and governmental atmosphere is
even worse than unhelpful to the private allocation of capital —
in many countries the atmosphere is positively hostile. Every
country has governmental regulations that facilitate rent-seeking from governmental officials and needlessly hamper productive activity. By needless regulations I am not referring to those
that are aimed at achieving some particular social benefit such
as pollution reduction or safety in the workplace. Regulation for
regulation’s sake is pervasive in Latin America and elsewhere.
In Lima, Hernando de Soto set up a simulated sole proprietor
clothing factory and needed 289 days, faced expenses of $1,231
dollars (at the time equal to thirty-two times the minimum
monthly salary), and could find no way to get around two of the
ten bribes requested in order to get the necessary legal
approvals. It is a small wonder that most Third World firms
belong to the informal sector. Of course, belonging to the informal sector prevents a firm from legally exporting its products
and from being able to acquire the capital required to grow
168
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beyond some quite small size. The incentives built into these
systems are truly perverse. Most of the firms do not want to get
very big, for then they will attract the government’s attention
and be forced to meet the many regulations or suffer high costs
in side payments to avoid them.
I could continue for quite some time, but I think the policies I
have mentioned above are the most crucial. For most countries
of the Third World, improvements in education and training in
productive skills are prerequisites for economic growth. Making
the financial system simpler, more transparent, and easier to
monitor will help in reducing the costs of investing. A legal system that protects the rights of both the owners of capital and the
workers, that makes incorporation and entry into the formal sector simple, that can effectively deal with business and governmental corruption, and that provides for stable transitions of
political power is necessary for growth. Too many of the politicians and intellectuals of the Third World look upon international markets, multinational firms, and their own business
communities as something to fear and avoid. While they cannot
control international markets, they can use them wisely. They
can (and do) control the legal system under which production
inside their own countries takes place. They must do this without imposing the weight of excess regulation on their own people. While governments have limited ability to make their
countries grow, they can easily prevent whatever growth might
be possible. This idea is far from new. I would like to end by
quoting advice to government officials given in Stephen
Mitchell’s translation of the Tao te Ching, written some 2,500
years ago.
When taxes are too high, people go hungry.
When the government is too intrusive, people lose their spirit.
Act for the people’s benefit.
Trust them, leave them alone.

Note
1. World Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994),
178.
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